D Flint wrote:
> What do you think about this and have you seen this popular site before?
> This was taken from a web site http://www.afvr.org
> How can we safeguard the integrity of each vote?
> Today we have technology that protects our financial systems, military
> weapon systems and national intelligent organizations. These proven
> systems can be combined in a way to issue serialized equipment to
> authorize personnel for the dates and hours needed. Each would have
> their own level of clearance to perform the tasks they are responsible
> for. Each action would be recorded and verified with a higher levels
> of network authority and again, only available during the hours and
> dates needed.
> Ballots would only be printed after the voter has cast
> their vote but before they leave the booth. If the voter made a
> mistake he could put the printed ballot into the booth's scanner for
> correction. All ballots scanned at the booth would go into a shredder
> and the voter could then correct his ballot on the screen and reprint
> his ballots.
> Once the voter accepts the printed ballot he submits his
> vote on the screen and takes the two ballots to the depository. So
> two computer generated, serialized and scanner perfect receipts of the
> completed ballot are printed.* One for the voter and one for the
> public record. This would eliminate all the extra ballots that could
> be used for unauthorized voting as well as any question of voter
This kind of transparency is the hallmark of reliable financial
systems. Counterintuitively, it is anathema to the secret ballot.
Any kind of system which produces a copy of the voter's ballot for
the voter to take away from the polling place practiaclly guarantees
that someone will offer payment to the voter if only they bring back
a receipt which shows a "correct" vote.
Full disclosure: I write software for ballot tabulation. But I think
I am not alone in believing that this much transparencey is too much.
Printing a receipt which stays in the polling place is another matter.
-- George Mitchell (obfuscated email address)